Barman, S and Ghalme, G and Jain, S and Kulkarni, P and Narang, S (2019) Fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents. In: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019, 13 - 17 May 2019, Montreal, pp. 1811-1813.
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Abstract
We study fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents in a single-parameter environment. This work specifically considers fairness in terms of envy freeness up to one good (EF1) and max-imin share guarantee (MMS). We show that (in a single-parameter environment) the problem of maximizing welfare, subject to the constraint that the allocation of the indivisible goods is EF1, admits a polynomial-time, 1/2-approximate, truthful auction. Under MMS setup, we develop a truthful auction which efficiently finds an allocation wherein each agent gets a bundle of value at least (1/2-f) times her maximin share and the welfare of the computed allocation is at least the optimal, here e > 0 is a fixed constant. Our results for EF1 and MMS are based on establishing interesting majorization inequalities.
Item Type: | Conference Paper |
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Publication: | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
Publisher: | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
Additional Information: | The copyright for this article belongs to International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). |
Keywords: | Approximation algorithms; Multi agent systems; Polynomial approximation, Auctions; Fair divisions; Indivisible good; Maximin; Polynomial-time; Single parameter; Social welfare; Truthful auctions, Autonomous agents |
Department/Centre: | Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation |
Date Deposited: | 05 Dec 2022 06:02 |
Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2022 06:02 |
URI: | https://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/78211 |
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