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Thirumulanathan, D and Sundaresan, R and Narahari, Y (2019) On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, 82 . pp. 31-60.
Thirumulanathan, D and Sundaresan, Rajesh and Narahari, Y (2019) Optimal mechanisms for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations. In: JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 82 . pp. 1-30.
Thirumulanathan, D and Vinay, H and Bhashyam, Srikrishna and Sundaresan, Rajesh (2017) Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good. In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 262 (3). pp. 1196-1207.
Thirumulanathan, D and Vinay, H and Bhashyam, Srikrishna and Sundaresan, Rajesh (2017) Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good. In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 262 (3). pp. 1196-1207.