Majumder, R and Ghose, D (2022) Three-player game-theoretic allocation of indivisible resources during natural disasters. In: Engineering Optimization .
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Resource allocation is an integral part of disaster management. After a natural disaster, multiple concurrent emergencies in distinct locations often make resource allocation challenging for the disaster management authority. This article focuses on disaster resource allocation based on a novel three-player, non-cooperative, single-stage, strategic game where the emergency locations are considered as the players. The decision-making authority solves a game-theoretic algorithm to determine a suitable strategy for allocating indivisible resources among three disaster locations where the available resources are insufficient to satisfy all the players simultaneously. Based on a unique non-monetary cost function, each player incurs a penalty for any possible allocation strategy. Mathematical analysis shows that, for the proposed game, at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) always exists, which can be a desirable allocation to the players. Payoff dominance and utopia-point-based solutions are used to select a single PSNE from a set of multiple PSNEs.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Publication: | Engineering Optimization |
| Publisher: | Taylor and Francis Ltd. |
| Additional Information: | The copyright for this article belongs to the Taylor and Francis Ltd. |
| Keywords: | Computation theory; Cost functions; Decision making; Disaster prevention; Economics; Game theory; Location; Resource allocation, Disaster management; Disaster resource allocation; Game-theoretic; Integral part; Nash equilibria; Natural disasters; Payoff dominance; Pure strategy nash equilibriums; Resources allocation; Utopia point, Disasters |
| Department/Centre: | Division of Mechanical Sciences > Aerospace Engineering(Formerly Aeronautical Engineering) |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Sep 2022 06:44 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2022 06:44 |
| URI: | https://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/76757 |
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