Learning equilibria for power allocation games in cognitive radio networks with a jammer

El Bardan, Raghed and Sharma, Vinod and Varshney, Pramod K (2017) Learning equilibria for power allocation games in cognitive radio networks with a jammer. In: 2016 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2016, 7-9 December 2016, Washington, pp. 1104-1109.

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Abstract

In this paper, competitive interactions between a secondary transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer are investigated in a distributed manner over N orthogonal frequency bands, each of which is licensed to a primary user (PU). There is an interference restriction at the secondary receiver (SR) and power budget constraints at the secondary transmitter (ST) and the jammer. In addition, the ST (jammer) does not know the channels' gains of the jammer (ST). After sensing each of the frequency bands, the ST and the jammer decide how to transmit information and how to block these transmissions respectively. In this respect, both the ST and the jammer incur a communication cost and the SR sends an acknowledgment (ACK) if it decodes the information correctly. Otherwise, it sends a negative ACK (NACK). The strategic and distributed power allocation between the ST and the jammer is modeled as a stochastic game in which we employ a multiplicative weight no-regret learning mechanism to obtain an equilibrium point.

Item Type:	Conference Paper
Publisher:	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Additional Information:	The copyright for this article belongs to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Keywords:	Cognitive radio networks; Game theory; Jammer; Learning and coarse-correlated equilibrium; Power allocation
Department/Centre:	Division of Electrical Sciences > Electrical Communication Engineering
Date Deposited:	07 Jun 2022 05:25
Last Modified:	07 Jun 2022 05:25
URI:	https://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/73205

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