Barman, S and Echenique, F (2020) The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies. In: 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2020, 13 - 17, July 2020, Hungary, pp. 765-766.
|
PDF
pro_acm_con_eco_com_765-766_2020.pdf - Published Version Download (897kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.
Item Type: | Conference Paper |
---|---|
Publication: | EC 2020 - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation |
Publisher: | Association for Computing Machinery, Inc |
Additional Information: | The copyright of this article belongs to the Authors. |
Department/Centre: | Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation |
Date Deposited: | 26 Aug 2020 11:51 |
Last Modified: | 25 May 2023 07:44 |
URI: | https://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/66367 |
Actions (login required)
![]() |
View Item |