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A double-auction mechanism for mobile data-offloading markets with strategic agents

Naveen, K P and Sundaresan, Rajesh (2018) A double-auction mechanism for mobile data-offloading markets with strategic agents. In: 16th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), MAY 07-11, 2018, Shanghai, PEOPLES R CHINA.

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Official URL: https://dx.doi.org/10.23919/WIOPT.2018.8362857


We consider a recently proposed double-auction mechanism for mobile data-offloading. Network operators (users) derive benefit from offloading their traffic to third party WiFi or femtocell network (link-supplier). A link-supplier experiences costs for the additional capacity that he provides. Users and link supplier (collectively referred to as agents) have their utilities and cost function as private knowledge. A system-designer decomposes the problem into a network problem (with surrogate utilities and surrogate cost functions) and agent problems (one per agent). The surrogate utilities and cost functions are modulated by the agents' bids. Agents' payoffs and costs are then determined by the allocations and prices set by the system designer. So long as the agents do not anticipate the effect of their actions, a competitive equilibrium exists as a solution to the network and agent problems, and this equilibrium optimizes the system utility. This work shows that when the agents are strategic (price-anticipating), the presence of strategic supplying agents drives the system to an undesirable equilibrium with zero participation. This is in stark contrast to the setting when link suppliers are not strategic where the efficiency loss is at most 34%. The paper then proposes a Stackelberg game modification to alleviate the efficiency loss problem. The system designer first announces the allocation and payment functions. He then invites the supplying agents to announce their bids. He then invites the users to respond to the suppliers' bids. The resulting efficiency loss is characterized in terms of the suppliers' cost functions.

Item Type: Conference Proceedings
Publisher: IEEE, 345 E 47TH ST, NEW YORK, NY 10017 USA
Additional Information: Copyright of this article belong to IEEE, 345 E 47TH ST, NEW YORK, NY 10017 USA
Department/Centre: Division of Electrical Sciences > Electrical Communication Engineering
Date Deposited: 05 Jul 2018 15:24
Last Modified: 06 Nov 2018 12:14
URI: http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/60161

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