ePrints@IIScePrints@IISc Home | About | Browse | Latest Additions | Advanced Search | Contact | Help

Router Attack toward NoC-enabled MPSoC and Monitoring Countermeasures against such Threat

Biswas, Arnab Kumar and Nandy, SK and Narayan, Ranjani (2015) Router Attack toward NoC-enabled MPSoC and Monitoring Countermeasures against such Threat. In: CIRCUITS SYSTEMS AND SIGNAL PROCESSING, 34 (10). pp. 3241-3290.

[img] PDF
Cir_Sys_and_Sig_Pro_34-10_3241_2015.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (10MB) | Request a copy
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00034-015-9980-0


The growing number of applications and processing units in modern Multiprocessor Systems-on-Chips (MPSoCs) come along with reduced time to market. Different IP cores can come from different vendors, and their trust levels are also different, but typically they use Network-on-Chip (NoC) as their communication infrastructure. An MPSoC can have multiple Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Apart from performance, power, and area research in the field of MPSoC, robust and secure system design is also gaining importance in the research community. To build a secure system, the designer must know beforehand all kinds of attack possibilities for the respective system (MPSoC). In this paper we survey the possible attack scenarios on present-day MPSoCs and investigate a new attack scenario, i.e., router attack targeted toward NoC architecture. We show the validity of this attack by analyzing different present-day NoC architectures and show that they are all vulnerable to this type of attack. By launching a router attack, an attacker can control the whole chip very easily, which makes it a very serious issue. Both routing tables and routing logic-based routers are vulnerable to such attacks. In this paper, we address attacks on routing tables. We propose different monitoring-based countermeasures against routing table-based router attack in an MPSoC having multiple TEEs. Synthesis results show that proposed countermeasures, viz. Runtime-monitor, Restart-monitor, Intermediate manager, and Auditor, occupy areas that are 26.6, 22, 0.2, and 12.2 % of a routing table-based router area. Apart from these, we propose Ejection address checker and Local monitoring module inside a router that cause 3.4 and 10.6 % increase of a router area, respectively. Simulation results are also given, which shows effectiveness of proposed monitoring-based countermeasures.

Item Type: Journal Article
Additional Information: Copy right for this article belongs to the SPRINGER BIRKHAUSER, 233 SPRING STREET, 6TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10013 USA
Keywords: Multiprocessor System-on-Chip security; Network-on-Chip security; Hardware security; Monitoring countermeasure; Router attack in NoC
Department/Centre: Division of Electrical Sciences > Electronic Systems Engineering (Formerly Centre for Electronic Design & Technology)
Division of Interdisciplinary Sciences > Supercomputer Education & Research Centre
Date Deposited: 11 Sep 2015 05:39
Last Modified: 11 Sep 2015 05:39
URI: http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/52351

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item