Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks

Hanawal, Manjesh K and Altman, Eitan and Sundaresan, Rajesh (2012) Game theoretic analysis of collusions in nonneutral networks. In: Proceedings of the first Workshop on Pricing and Incentives in Networks (W-PIN 2012), July 31, 2012, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper studies the impact of exclusive contracts between a content provider (CP) and an internet service provider (ISP) in a nonneutral network. We consider a simple linear demand function for the CPs. We studywhen an exclusive contract is benefcial to the colluding pair and evaluate its impact on the noncolluding players at equilibrium. For the case of two CPs and one ISP we show that collusion may not always be benefcial. We derive an explicit condition in terms of the advertisement revenues of the CPs that tells when a collusion is proftable to the colluding entities.

Item Type:	Conference Paper
Publisher:	Association for Computing Machinery
Additional Information:	Copyright of this article belongs to Association for Computing Machinery.
Department/Centre:	Division of Electrical Sciences > Electrical Communication Engineering
Date Deposited:	18 Dec 2013 10:02
Last Modified:	18 Dec 2013 10:02
URI:	http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/48025

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