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Broadcast in Adhoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach

Rama Suri, N and Narahari, Y (2007) Broadcast in Adhoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach. In: 2nd International Conference on Communication Systems Software and Middleware, 2007. COMSWARE 2007. , 7-12 Jan. 2007, Bangalore.

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We consider the incentive compatible broadcast (ICB) problem in ad hoc wireless networks with selfish nodes. We design a Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B) protocol to address this problem. VCG mechanism based schemes have been popularly used in the literature to design dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) protocols for ad hoc wireless networks. VCG based mechanisms have two critical limitations: (i) the network is required to be bi-connected, (ii) the resulting protocol is not budget balanced. Our proposed BIC-B protocol overcomes these difficulties. We also prove the optimality of the proposed scheme.

Item Type: Conference Paper
Publisher: IEEE
Additional Information: Copyright 2007 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
Keywords: Ad hoc wireless networks;VCG mechanisms;broadcast;budget balance;dAGVA mechanism;incentive compatibility;rationality; selfish nodes
Department/Centre: Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation
Date Deposited: 17 Oct 2011 05:29
Last Modified: 17 Oct 2011 05:29
URI: http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/41468

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