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A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access

Aram, Alireza and Sarkar, Saswati and Singh, Chandramani and Kumar, Anurag (2008) A Coalitional Game Framework for Cooperative Secondary Spectrum Access. In: Forty-Sixth Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, September 23-26, 2008, UIUC, Illinois, USA.

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We consider a framework in which several service providers offer downlink wireless data access service in a certain area. Each provider serves its end-users through opportunistic secondary spectrum access of licensed spectrum, and needs to pay primary license holders of the spectrum usage based and membership based charges for such secondary spectrum access. In these circumstances, if providers pool their resources and allow end-users to be served by any of the cooperating providers, the total user satisfaction as well as the aggregate revenue earned by providers may increase. We use coalitional game theory to investigate such cooperation among providers, and show that the optimal cooperation schemes can be obtained as solutions of convex optimizations. We next show that under usage based charging scheme, if all providers cooperate, there always exists an operating point that maximizes the aggregate revenue of providers, while presenting each provider a share of the revenue such that no subset of providers has an incentive to leave the coalition. Furthermore, such an operating point can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show that when the charging scheme involves membership based charges, the above result holds in important special cases.

Item Type: Conference Paper
Department/Centre: Division of Electrical Sciences > Electrical Communication Engineering
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2011 08:50
Last Modified: 19 Sep 2011 08:50
URI: http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/40588

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