Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Searth Auctions

Das, Akash Sarma and Gujar, Sujit and Narahari, Y (2010) Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Searth Auctions. arXiv:1001.1414.

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Abstract

In pay-per click sponsored search auctions which are currently extensively used by search engines, the auction for a keyword involves a certain number of advertisers (say k) competing for available slots (say m) to display their ads. This auction is typically conducted for a number of rounds (say T). There are click probabilities mu_ij associated with agent-slot pairs. The search engine's goal is to maximize social welfare, for example, the sum of values of the advertisers. The search engine does not know the true value of an advertiser for a click to her ad and also does not know the click probabilities mu_ij s. A key problem for the search engine therefore is to learn these during the T rounds of the auction and also to ensure that the auction mechanism is truthful. Mechanisms for addressing such learning and incentives issues have recently been introduced and would be referred to as multi-armed-bandit (MAB) mechanisms. When m = 1,characterizations for truthful MAB mechanisms are available in the literature and it has been shown that the regret for such mechanisms will be O(T^{2/3}). In this paper, we seek to derive a characterization in the realistic but nontrivial general case when m > 1 and obtain several interesting results.

Item Type:	Departmental Technical Report
Department/Centre:	Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation
Date Deposited:	09 Nov 2011 06:48
Last Modified:	09 Nov 2011 06:48
URI:	http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/40341

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