ePrints@IIScePrints@IISc Home | About | Browse | Latest Additions | Advanced Search | Contact | Help

Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach

Suri, Rama N (2006) Design of incentive compatible protocols for wireless networks: A game theoretic approach. In: IEEE INFOCOM 2006 Conference/25th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications,, Apr 23-29, 2006, Barcelona, Spain, pp. 3236-3237.

[img] PDF
04146727.pdf - Published Version
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (42kB) | Request a copy
Official URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumb...


In this thesis work, we design rigorous and efficient protocols/mechanisms for different types of wireless networks using a mechanism design [1] and game theoretic approach [2]. Our work can broadly be viewed in two parts. In the first part, we concentrate on ad hoc wireless networks [3] and [4]. In particular, we consider broadcast in these networks where each node is owned by independent and selfish users. Being selfish, these nodes do not forward the broadcast packets. All existing protocols for broadcast assume that nodes forward the transit packets. So, there is need for developing new broadcast protocols to overcome node selfishness. In our paper [5], we develop a strategy proof pricing mechanism which we call immediate predecessor node pricing mechanism (IPNPM) and an efficient new broadcast protocol based on IPNPM. We show the efficacy of our proposed broadcast protocol using simulation results.

Item Type: Conference Paper
Publisher: IEEE
Additional Information: Copyright 2006 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
Department/Centre: Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation
Date Deposited: 31 Aug 2010 05:04
Last Modified: 19 Sep 2010 06:12
URI: http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/30446

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item