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Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks

Dikshit, Devansh and Yadati, Narahari (2009) Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks. In: 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, DEC 14-18, 2009, Sapienza Univ, Dept Comp & Syst Sci, Rome, ITALY, pp. 386-397.

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Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/content/h22v686864121u...


Query incentive networks capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks such as a social network. Several game theoretic tilt:Kids of query incentive networks have been proposed in the literature to study and characterize the dependence, of the monetary reward required to extract the answer for a query, on various factors such as the structure of the network, the level of difficulty of the query, and the required success probability.None of the existing models, however, captures the practical andimportant factor of quality of answers. In this paper, we develop a complete mechanism design based framework to incorporate the quality of answers, in the monetization of query incentive networks. First, we extend the model of Kleinberg and Raghavan [2] to allow the nodes to modulate the incentive on the basis of the quality of the answer they receive. For this qualify conscious model. we show are existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and study the impact of quality of answers on the growth rate of the initial reward, with respect to the branching factor of the network. Next, we present two mechanisms; the direct comparison mechanism and the peer prediction mechanism, for truthful elicitation of quality from the agents. These mechanisms are based on scoring rules and cover different; scenarios which may arise in query incentive networks. We show that the proposed quality elicitation mechanisms are incentive compatible and ex-ante budget balanced. We also derive conditions under which ex-post budget balance can beachieved by these mechanisms.

Item Type: Conference Paper
Series.: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher: Springer
Additional Information: Copyright of this article belongs to Springer.
Department/Centre: Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation
Date Deposited: 14 Jun 2010 07:24
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2013 05:45
URI: http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/28370

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