The core and shapley value analysis for cooperative formation of procurement networks

Chandrashekar, TS and Narahari, Y (2007) The core and shapley value analysis for cooperative formation of procurement networks. In: 9th IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce Technology/4th IEEE International Conference on Enterprise Computing, E-Commerce and E-Services, JUL 23-26, 2007, Tokyo.

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Abstract

Formation of high value procurement networks involves a bottom-up assembly of complex production, assembly, and exchange relationships through supplier selection and contracting decisions, where suppliers are intelligent and rational agents who act strategically. In this paper we address the problem of forming procurement networks for items with value adding stages that are linearly arranged We model the problem of Procurement Network Formation (PNF) for multiple units of a single item as a cooperative game where agents cooperate to form a surplus maximizing procurement network and then share the surplus in a stable and fair manner We first investigate the stability of such networks by examining the conditions under which the core of the game is non-empty. We then present a protocol, based on the extensive form game realization of the core, for forming such networks so that the resulting network is stable. We also mention a key result when the Shapley value is applied as a solution concept.

Item Type:	Conference Paper
Publisher:	IEEE
Additional Information:	Copyright 2007 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
Department/Centre:	Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation
Date Deposited:	10 Jun 2010 05:25
Last Modified:	19 Sep 2010 05:59
URI:	http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/26877

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