Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes

Suri, Rama N and Narahari, Y (2008) Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes. In: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 26 (7). pp. 1138-1148.

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Abstract

Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Publication:	IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Publisher:	IEEE
Additional Information:	Copyright 2008 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.
Keywords:	ad hoc wireless networks;incentive compatible broadcast (ICB);rationality;selfish nodes;Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast (BIC-B);Dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast (DSIC-B);least cost path (LCP);source rooted broadcast tree (SRBT);budget balance;individual rationality.
Department/Centre:	Division of Electrical Sciences > Computer Science & Automation
Date Deposited:	14 Oct 2008 07:09
Last Modified:	19 Sep 2010 04:50
URI:	http://eprints.iisc.ac.in/id/eprint/15984

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